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PHILOSOPHY  AND  ELECTRONIC  PUBLISHING.  THEORY  AND  METATHEORY  IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEXT ENCODING
This article is an account of an electronic discussion which took place between November
1995 and June 1996. A number of specialists in relevant research areas had been invited
to  take  part  in  the  discussion  from the  very  beginning,  and  some were  added  later.
Altogether  30  individuals  subscribed  to  the  list.  The  "target  paper,"  written  by  Allen
Renear, was sent to the list on November 27, 1995. The target paper alone comprised
8,500 words. The ensuing discussion, to which 9 of the members on the list made one or
more individual contributions, comprises 30 entries of altogether 37,000 words. It is the
function of this printed article to provide a brief summary and a key to the full electronic
discussion which accompanies it.
There  are  quite  a  number  of  things  that  might  be  discussed  under  the  heading
"Philosophy  and  Electronic  Publishing."  For  instance  there  are  issues  related  to  how
computers,  networks,  and software can support  scholarly  collaboration and publishing
within  the  philosophical  community.  However,  this  discussion  does  not  take  up  these
topics  but  focuses  on  a  topic  in  the  philosophy  of  electronic  publishing,  pursuing  a
particular  set  of  philosophical  issues  that  have  emerged  from  within  the  electronic
publishing community.
The issues in question concern the nature of text and those parts of texts, or features of
texts, which are identified as important by the designers of text processing systems and
other practitioners concerned with the representation of text on the computer, such as
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scholarly editors and systems analysts. The natural history of these discussions is a case
study in theory construction and reveals engineers, systems analysts and scholarly editors
to be concerned with practical problems which raise philosophical issues. The course of
this  theory  construction  is  a  familiar  philosophical  dialectic  from a  kind  of  Platonism,
through a more pluralistic Realism, to pragmatic Constructivism. The philosophical topics
raised include the boundary between philosophical and scientific ontology, the nature of
classification  and  natural  kind  terms,  and  Realism  and  Antirealism.  The  ensuing
discussion in the electronic discussion group continued to evolve these arguments, mostly
commenting directly on the target paper, but also commenting on an alternative theory
introduced by Selmer Bringsjord, the so-called "JoPP" proposal.
1. Edited Version of Renear's Target Paper
Discussions  of  theoretical  or  philosophical  issues  in  text  encoding  have  always  been
important to our community and there has throughout been a certain amount of published
critique and engagement: Mamrak et al. (1988) and Raymond et al. (1993) respond to
Coombs et al. (1987), Fortier (1995) responds to an early version of the TEI Guidelines;
Sperberg-McQueen (1991) responds to Fortier (1995); Huitfeldt (1995) to DeRose et al.
(1990) and Renear et  al.  (1992),  etc.  I  am particularly interested in how the views of
textuality have evolved from a kind of Platonic essentialism to positions that seem more
Antirealist.
Both the representation of linguistic content and the inclusion of additional information
about either the editorial structure or the format of a document are generally included in
the notion of text encoding.
Early  computer  systems  used  "format-based  text  processing."  The  data  file  typically
consisted  of  (i)  the  linguistic  character  content  (e.g.,  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,
punctuation marks, digits, and symbols) and (ii) interspersed codes indicating information
about  that  content.  The  identification  of  linguistic  content  is  relatively  unproblematic.
Obviously certain patterns of formatting codes tended to recur and in the systematic use
of these codes there was a natural tendency to identify a code not with its formatting
effects,  but  directly  with  a  type  of  text  element.  In  the  1970s  a  number  of  software
designers and computer scientists came independently to the conclusion that the best
way to design efficient and functional text processing systems was to base them on the
view that there are certain features of texts which are fundamental and salient, and that all
processing  of  texts  should  be  implemented  indirectly  through  the  identification  and
processing of these features. These features have been called "content objects" (DeRose
et al. 1990) and this approach to text processing "content-based text processing."
The earliest  endorsement  of  this  approach was by  software engineers  who offered a
theoretical  backing  which  both  explained  and  predicted  its  efficiencies  (Reid  1981,
Goldfarb 1981). But in the course of the discussion, some partisans of content-based text
processing  inevitably  claimed  more  directly  that  alternative  representational  practices
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were inefficient because they were based on a "false model" of text (Coombs et al. 1987,
DeRose et al. 1990).
The two different approaches to text processing; format-based and contentbased, seemed
to locate their differences in the kinds of markup they deployed. Text encoding theorists
explored  its  nature,  providing  taxonomies  and  distinctions.  Three  types  of  markup  in
particular are typically identified: Descriptive Markup which identifies a particular textual
element, e.g., "<paragraph>," "<title>," "<stanza>"; Procedural Markup which specifies a
procedure to be performed, typically a formatting procedure, e.g., ".sk 3;.in 5;" meaning
"skip 3 lines, indent 5 columns"; and Presentational Markup which consists of graphic
devices such as leading, font changes, word spaces, etc.
The interplay between these three categories of markup during a typical instance of text
processing suggests both that they mark salient aspects of text processing and suggests
a certain priority for descriptive markup. An effort to standardize markup systems begun in
the  early  1980s  and  eventually  resulted  in  an  international  standard  for  defining
descriptive markup systems, ISO 8879: "Information Processing, Text and Office Systems,
Standard  Generalized  Markup  Language."  (SGML)  SGML  is  a  "meta-grammar"  for
defining sets of markup tags. The technique for specifying these syntactical constraints is
similar to the production rule meta-grammar developed by Noam Chomsky to describe
natural  languages.  The  principal  vehicle  for  the  development  and  standardization  of
descriptive markup for the humanities is the "Text Encoding Initiative" (TEI). There are
several  advantages  to  this  kind  of  content-based  text  processing:  composition  is
simplified, writing tools are supported, alternative document views and links are facilitated,
formatting  can  be  generically  specified  and  modified,  apparatus  construction  can  be
automated,  output  device  support  is  enhanced,  portability  is  maximized,  information
retrieval is supported, and analytical procedures are supported.
Phase one of the textual ontology was a form of Platonism. The earliest arguments for the
content-object approach to text processing were not intended to make an ontological point
about "what texts really are," but rather to promote a particular set of techniques and
practices  as  being  more  efficient  and functional  than the  competing  alternatives.  The
straightforward ontological question posed by DeRose et al. (1990) "What is Text, Really?"
was given a straightforward ontological answer: "text is a hierarchy of content objects," or,
in a slogan and an acronym, text is an "OHCO." The claim is that in some relevant sense
of  "book",  "text,"  or  "document"  (perhaps "qua intellectual  objects")  these things "are"
ordered hierarchies of content objects. They are "hierarchical" because these objects nest
inside one another. They are "ordered" because there is a linear relationship to objects:
for any two objects within a book one object comes before the other. They are "content
objects" because they organize text into natural units that are, in some sense, based on
meaning  and  communicative  intentions.  In  the  writings  and  conversations  of  the  text
encoding community in the 1980s and early 1990s at least these five broad categories of
arguments that text is an ordered hierarchy of content objects can be discerned.
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Pragmatic/Scientific: Texts modeled as OHCOs are easier to create, modify, analyze, etc.
The comparative efficiency and functionality of treating texts "as if" they were OHCOs is
best explained, according to this argument, by the hypothesis that texts "are" OHCOs.
Empirical/Ontological: Content objects and their relations figure very prominently in our
talk about texts,  e.g.,  titles,  stanzas,  lines,  etc.,  and in our theorizing about texts and
related subjects such as authorship, criticism, etc. If we resolve ontological questions by
looking to the nominal phrases in our theoretical assertions, then we will conclude that
such  things  exist  and  are  the  components  of  texts.  The  persuasiveness  of  these
arguments is increased by the fact that theories from many diverse disciplines, and even
conflicting theories, are committed to content objects as fundamental explanatory entities.
Metaphysical/Essentialist: This is the classic argument from hypothetical variation, used to
distinguish essential from accidental properties in scholastic metaphysics or, in a more
contemporary philosophical idiom, to establish "identity conditions" for objects. Here one
argues that if a layout feature of a text changes, the "text itself" still remains essentially the
same; but if the number or structure of the text's content objects changes, say the number
of chapters varies or one paragraph is replaced by another, then it is no longer "the same
text."
Productive Power: An OHCO representation of a text can mechanically generate other
competing representations, e.g., an OHCO representation can be formatted into a bitmap
image,  but  none of  these other  representations can mechanically  generate an OHCO
representation.  This  is  closely  connected with  the  pragmatic/scientific  arguments:  that
OHCO representatives are richer in information and are more effective for managing text
processing.
Conceptual  Priority:  Understanding and creating text  necessarily  requires grasping the
OHCO structure of a text, but does not essentially involve grasping any other structure.
Therefore it is the OHCO structure that is essential to textuality.
If the forgoing arguments are good then the OHCO thesis: explains the success of certain
representational  strategies;  is  logically  implied by  many important  theories  about  text;
matches our intuitions about what is essential and what accidental about textual identity;
is richer in relevant content than competing models;  and matches our intuitions about
what is essential of textual production and consumption.
Phase two was pluralistic. When researchers from the literary and linguistic communities
began using SGML in their work, the implicit assumption that every document could be
represented as a single logical hierarchical structure quickly created practical problems for
text encoding (Barnard et al. 1988). For example, a verse drama contains dialogue lines,
metrical lines, and sentences, but these do not fit in a single hierarchy of non-overlapping
objects.  Taking  one  particular  sense  of  textual  identity  led  the  SGML  community  to
assume  that  there  was  only  one  logical  hierarchy  for  each  document.  However,
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researchers from TEI found that there seemed to be many "logical" hierarchies that had
equal claim to be constitutive of the text. Thus where the original OHCO Platonists and
the designers of SGML took the editorial hierarchy of genre to be primary, the literary
scholars  of  the  TEI  took  the  structures  elicited  by  specialized  disciplines  and
methodological practices to be equally important.
The natural  modification  of  OHCO Platonism was to  see  texts  not  as  single  ordered
hierarchies, but as a "system" of ordered hierarchies. Each hierarchy corresponds to an
"aspect" of the text and these aspects are revealed by various "analytic perspectives,"
where an analytical perspective is, roughly, a natural family of methodology, theory, and
analytical practice. Each analytical perspective (AP), e.g., prosodic, on a text does seem
to  typically  determine  a  hierarchy  of  elements.  The  doctrine  affirms  the  following
hierarchy-saving principle:
AP-1:  An analytical  perspective on a text  determines an ordered hierarchy of  content
objects.
AP-1 seems to  reflect  actual  text  encoding practices in  the literary  and linguistic  text
encoding communities. However, there are technical terms, such as "enjambment" and
"caesura,"  that  specifically  refer  to  relationships  between  objects  from  overlapping
families.  Because  a  technical  vocabulary  can  be  considered  a  sign  of  an  analytical
perspective the existence of this terminology suggests that some analytical perspectives
contain  overlapping  objects.  However,  one  might  attempt  to  accommodate  this
counterexample with a revision still very much in the spirit of recognizing hierarchies as
fundamentally important:
AP-2: For every distinct pair of objects x and y that overlap in the structure determined by
some perspective P(1), there exist diverse perspectives P(2) and P(3) such that P(2) and
P(3) are subperspectives of P(1) and x is an object in P(2) and not in P(3) and y is an
object in P(3) and not in P(2)
where: "x is a sub-perspective of y" if and only if x is a perspective and y is a perspective
and the rules, theories, methods, and practices of x are all included in the rules, theories,
methods, and practices of y, but not vice versa. Our simple Platonic model of text as an
ordered  hierarchy  of  content  objects  has  given  way  to  a  system  of  concurrent
perspectives. Moreover, Huitfeldt has pointed out that despite the apparent hierarchical
tendency within analytical perspectives, not only is there no assurance that decomposition
into ultimate sub-perspectives without overlaps is possible, but we can also demonstrate
that it is not possible. Possible element tokens in some perspectives clearly overlap with
other element tokens "of the same type." Examples of this are strikeouts, versions, and
phrases  (in  textual  criticism),  narrative  objects  in  narratology,  hypertext  anchors  and
targets, and many others.
Phase three was Antirealistic. Modifying OHCO Platonism to Pluralism introduces the role
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that disciplinary methodologies and analytic practices play in text encoding. Some text
encoding theorists see text encoding not as merely identifying the features of a text but as
playing a more constitutive role. Pichler has made a number of statements that seem to
be clear expressions of Antirealism, e.g.,
Machine-readable texts make it... clear to us what texts are and what text editing means:
Texts are not objectively existing entities which just need to be discovered and presented,
but entities which have to be constructed. (Pichler 1995b, p.774)
Pluralistic Realism allowed that there are many perspectives on a text, but assumes that
texts have the structures they have independently of our interests, our theories, and our
beliefs about them. The Antirealist trend in text encoding rejects this view seeing texts as
the  product  of  the  theories  and  analytical  tools  we  deploy  when  we  transcribe,  edit,
analyze, or encode them. Just as Landow (1992), Bolter (1991), and Lanham (1993) have
claimed that electronic textuality confirms certain tenets of post-modernism, Pichler and
others  also  suggest  that  texts  do  not  exist  independently  and  objectively,  but  are
constructed  by  us.  The  passage  from  Pichler  is  ontological  but  he  also  endorses  a
companion Antirealism that is semantic:
... the essential question is not about a true representation, but: Whom do we want to
serve with our transcriptions? Philosophers? Grammarians? Or graphologists? What is
"correct" will depend on the answer to this question. And what we are going to represent,
and  how,  is  determined  by  our  research  interests..,  and  not  by  a  text  which  exists
independently and which we are going to depict. (Pichlet 1995a, p.690)
Our aim in transcription is not to represent as correctly as possible the originals, but rather
to prepare from the original text another text so as to serve as accurately as possible
certain interests in the text. (Pichler 1995a, p.6).
Huitfeldt (1995) also presented a number of criticisms of OHCO Platonism. His Antirealist
tendencies are subtle for the most part:
... I have come to think that these questions [e.g., What is a text?] do not represent a
fruitful first approach to our theme... The answer to the question what is a text depends on
the context, methods and purpose of our investigations. (Huitfeldt 1995, p.235)
But here and there they are unmistakable:
`devising  a  representational  system  that  does  not  impose  but  only  maps  linguistic
structures' (Coulmas 1989) is impossible (p. 238).
Both Huitfeldt and Pichler emphasize two particular claims about text and seem to see
arguments for Antirealism. The first is that our understanding (representation, encoding,
etc.) of a text is fundamentally interpretational: "there are no facts about a text which are
objective in the sense of not being interpretational" (Huitfeldt 1995, p.237). Although he
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assures us that this does not mean that all facts about a texts are entirely subjective as
"there are some things about which all competent readers agree" (ibid.). The second is
that there are many diverse methodological perspectives on a text: "a text may have many
different kinds of structure (physical, compositional, narrative, grammatical)" (ibid.).
The first claim is that representation and transcription is interpretational at every level.
Assuming that "interpretation" here means inference, what is the significance of the claim
that our knowledge of text is inferential? The missing premise would be that entities that
could only be inferred in principle, are not real.  That is,  the argument depends on an
extreme form of  positivism. The second claim is  that  there are many diverse analytic
perspectives on a text. Here the premise needed to get to the Antirealist conclusion would
be that if what we find in the world is determined at least in part by our interests and by
the methodologies and theories we choose to deploy in the course of inquiry, then what
there is in the world is determined by our interests, theories, and methods.
The  above  comments  pertain  directly  to  ontological  Antirealism.  Epistemological
Antirealism in text encoding probably derives in part from the ontological, so my response
to ontological Realism also removes the support it gives to epistemological Antirealism.
But as epistemological Antirealism can also draw some support from other sources we
might consider these Antirealist  claims independently.  Considering again the quotation
from Pichler:
Our aim in transcription is not to represent as correctly as possible the originals, but rather
to prepare from the original text another text so as to serve as accurately as possible
certain interests in the text. (Pichler 1995a, p.6).
I  would  argue  that  the  apparently  Antirealist  formulations  of  this  claim  are  either  (1)
non-antirealist truisms, (2) covertly Realist truths, or (3) false. It is certainly true that our
aim in transcription is to help researchers and that this guides our encoding decisions. If
this is what Pichler is saying it is a truism of encoding. But if he is saying that truth doesn't
matter  to  encoders,  then  he  is  saying  something  false.  Suppose  a  transcription  has
nothing at all to do with the text but helps the researcher win a prize. In such a case a
(false) transcription would serve the researcher's interests quite well, but no one would
claim  that  it  is  thereby  a  reasonable  encoding,  or  one  which  is  to  be  in  any  sense
commended as a transcription.
In their articles both Huitfeldt and Pichler are making very profound observations about
text encoding, transcription, and texts. I have ignored coming to grips with what is deep
and  perhaps  correct  in  their  arguments  in  order  to  make  my  own points  about  their
apparent  Antirealism.  But  regardless  of  their  intentions  I  think  that  what  they  say,
particularly  against  the  current  post-modern  background,  raises  Antirealist  questions
about the nature of theories of text and text encoding.
2. The Edited Discussion
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In response to Renear's summary, Pichler prefers to draw attention to the problems raised
by "intertextuality" rather than post-modernism. In particular, he discusses some limiting
cases of intentional intertextuality, e.g., the reader interprets text A as referring to text B in
conditions where it is not known whether the author knew of text B, or where it is known
that the author did not know text B. A further limiting case may be represented by the
author asserting a reference to text B when the attribution should be to text C. Pichler
sees the capacity for intertextuality as inherent in our notion of text in a way which cannot
be  removed  by  refining  our  definition  of  it.  Clearly  the  "intentional"  component  is  a
weakness,  partly  on  the  basis  of  identity  and  partly  as  a  result  of  the  "intended  but
mistaken attribution" limiting case. Pichler comes to the conclusion that it is always the
reader (i.e. the interpreter, which also includes the author) who is the decisive authority in
questions of intertextuality. However, he defends this against relativism by claiming that all
readers belong to a community which not only establishes, but also controls practice.
Pichler also raises an ontological argument leading to similar conclusions. As a transcriber
of Wittgenstein's manuscripts he was confronted with the Wittgenstein Archive's guideline
for  transcription:  "the  aim  of  transcription  is  to  represent  the  original  manuscripts  as
accurately as possible." This guideline seemed to be accepted by several transcription
and  manuscript-editing  projects  in  a  "realistic"  sense.  However,  definition  fails  to
determine  what  of  the  original  manuscript  should  be  represented  as  accurately  as
possible,  and what  is  meant  by accuracy.  It  is  clear  that  one cannot  be supposed to
represent every structure (linguistic,  prosodic, etc.)  of the manuscript as accurately as
possible.  Also  "accuracy"  is  determined  by  one's  interests  in  the  text.  Therefore  his
inclination to identify textual structures as a reader's concept was strengthened, along with
his denial that there is an objectively existing structure which just needs to be depicted.
The Antirealist has still to establish why any representation may not be regarded as simply
a selection from an objectively existing entity called the text. Pichler draws a comparison
between his position and the Kantian distinction between "Ding an sich" and "Erscheinung
fur uns." Pichler's preference is to agree with Fichte and find no necessity for "Ding an
sich." Similarly, if "meaning" is taken as the essential property of texts disclosed through
interpretation,  then  there  are  as  many  essential  texts  as  there  are  alternative
interpretations.  Pichler's  experience  of  encoding  Wittgenstein  strengthens  this  view.
Wittgenstein's  Nachlass,  with  its  corrections,  alternative  readings,  instructions  etc.
requires "constructing" by the reader or encoder. There are multiple constructions, any of
which must  be defended by the reader.  In  this  case there is  a considerable disparity
between the Nachlass-object which might be regarded as the text in its physical sense,
and  the  necessary  intervention  of  the  reader  in  forming  one  of  many  possible
constructions.
Pichler emphasizes that his position, which may be called a pragmatic Constructivism,
does  by  no  means  lead  to  an  uncontrolled  relativism.  Furthermore,  with  the  growing
practice  of  machine  assisted  text  encoding  the  process  of  construction  is  easily
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controllable, it is revisable, and it can be made explicit.
Biggs already identifies two distinct models of text being discussed. On the one hand
Renear  describes  a  process  in  which  the  linguistic  content  is  fixed,  or  completely
determinable.  On the  other,  Pichler  describes  a  text  that  is  open to  some degree  of
interpretation. One encoding problem is to identify the OHCOs. However, this task will
vary in difficulty between a fairly straightforward "academic" text in which the Realist finds
"the medium is not the message;" and a text about radical typography, or the example
from  Goethe  introduced  later  by  Sperberg-McQueen,  in  which  "the  medium  is  the
message."
Biggs also discusses Pichler's notion of "correctness" quoted by Renear. This notion might
lead us to say that the Real text is the correct text for a particular user. Unfortunately the
encoder of Wittgenstein is in the position of supplying a tool which users will employ to
determine the semantic reference of ambiguous passages. Biggs therefore finds it difficult
to see how the encoder, who is not the end-user, is in the position of isolating one correct
text for any user.
An additional difficulty with Wittgenstein is that the linguistic content also refers to the
business  of  reading  (cf.  transcribing)  and  interpretation.  Firstly,  when  we  read  under
normal circumstances (Renear's conditions) we do not interpret. However, in extremely
ambiguous  conditions  such  as  those  described  by  Pichler  there  may  be  insufficient
syntactic evidence to decide between two alternative readings. Then we may be forced to
make an interpretation on the basis of (semantic) evidence gained elsewhere in the text or
beyond. This will be determined by our analytical perspective.
In addition to the signifying function of the alphanumeric string, the interword space is also
significant.  Likewise,  the  grouping  of  concepts  at  a  paragraph  level,  indicated  by
line-breaks  rather  than  an  alphanumeric  character,  may  have  a  bearing  on  the
interpretation of the text string. It is therefore false to identify the linguistic content only
with the alphanumeric string. An example from Wittgenstein would be the truth-table. It is
the  case,  however,  that  some  other  features  of  the  layout  of  the  text  string  on  the
page/screen are mainly design functions rather than linguistic ones.
Biggs proposes more radical conditions which at first sight seem to favour the position of
the Antirealist. They frequently occur within the context of a discussion of "seeing as." As
a reader one may react to the ambiguous feature and "read-it-as" an instance of "this" or
an instance of "that,", e.g., as a duck or as a rabbit (Philosophical Investigations, p. 194).
However, as an encoder one must preserve the ambiguity. One must first recognise the
deliberate ambiguity, and then encode it so that the linguistic content and the on-screen
presentation preserves these two senses. But Wittgenstein also introduces the concept of
aspect blindness whose purpose is to suggest that we might be aspect-blind ourselves
under other circumstances. Biggs suggests that these more radical  conditions are the
meta-conditions under which the Antirealist text-encoder works. One does not know which
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are the signs which bear meaning and which are simply accidentals. A prototype text may
reveal the possibility of another approach to the use of signs either by showing that the
first reading of the text is senseless, or by showing that arguments regarding alternative
signification  may  be  advanced,  e.g.,  the  editorial  process  of  publishing  Wittgenstein.
However, one might assert that by the 1990s there is an established convention for the
content of "the published works of Wittgenstein" which places those texts in the Realist's
domain.
Raymond  concentrates  on  the  structural  approaches  epitomised  in  Renear's  OHCO
discussion.  Raymond  rejects  the  efficiency  arguments  which  objectify  OHCOs  in
preference to other analytical constructs. In particular, he finds the transfer of computer
terminology such as "text file" insidious. The implication that the text file "contains" text is
as misleading as the suggestion that a payroll database "contains" the payroll. In general
he draws the distinction between manipulating texts successfully using frameworks such
as OHCOs, and the lack of any necessity to also provide a coherent theory of text. For
example,  advocates of  OHCO seem to suggest that  the structure of  a document is a
property of the document that is independent of the operations to be performed on it, or of
other issues such as how we decide the equivalence of documents. He suggests that to
"structure"  information  means  to  encode it  in  such  a  way  that  certain  operations  are
efficient and others are not.  By the time one has structure,  one is already halfway to
operations. For example, the computer text file, with no embedded markup, is designed to
facilitate sequential reading and appending to the end of the text, but not insertions into
the middle of the text.
Raymond's  external  argument  criticises  advocates  of  OHCO  for  suggesting  that
OHCO-like structures should capture only structure and not semantics (e.g., SGML). He
argues that structure always involves semantics, and there is no such thing as "pure"
structure, because structure always has mathematical and combinatorial properties that
make certain types of operation possible or efficient. Hence structures are chosen which
support the operations we think we want to do, which in turn reflect the semantics that we
implicitly attach to the text. Even the idea that OHCO captures the essence of a text is a
statement of some semantic import.  He cites the Web as an example of what people
actually do when they have to commit real resources. The "best" approach to text has to
take into account not only the text, but the uses that are planned for it. OHCO can provide
advantages  in  accessing  highly  structured  information  and  in  permitting  flexibility  in
presentation.  There  is  a  prima  facie  case  that  flexibility  in  presentation  is  not  that
important, that portability via Postscript is sufficient, that structure-based editing is not that
popular, and that searching by simple string matching goes a long way. However, OHCO
and SGML advocates suggest that the benefit comes later, when new applications are
developed and one does not have to re-encode texts.
Sperberg-McQueen's  comments  elaborate  the  problem of  document  identity,  an  issue
raised by Raymond (1996). If we see some of our objects as text representations we can
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consider their representational validity in their ability to maintain or to lose information in
relation to the original. However, this does not avoid the definition of what constitutes the
original  text,  and  how to  determine  whether  for  some feature  F  of  the  text,  a  given
reproduction of the text preserves or loses that feature.
He also disagrees with Renear's assertion that the identification of linguistic content is
relatively unproblematic. For example, the characters of the text must be represented; in
some cases, this requires an analysis (a priori or a posteriori) of what characters actually
exist in, or should be used to represent, the text. Spoken material may be transcribed
phonetically, phonemically, or orthographically. The creator of an electronic text must also
select which material is to be included as part of "the text." Is the title page of the First
Folio part of the text of Shakespeare's Hamlet? Is the title "Hamlet" part of the text of that
play?  Finally,  the  transcriber  of  written  material  into  electronic  form must  reduce  the
two-dimensional page to a one-dimensional data stream. Footnotes must be transcribed
at their point of reference, etc. It is hard to find plausible rules for this without grounding
them in some view of what the "text" is.
It  appears obvious to most  computer-literate speakers of  English where the boundary
between characters of the text and markup should lie, but this is an illusion fostered by the
success of the ASCII character set.  In non-European writing systems, such as that of
Japanese, the absence of a long tradition of prior art for mechanical writing means that it
is not clear whether furigana and similar phenomena should be handled in the character
set or in markup. In their simplest form, furigana provide a full or partial phonetic reading
of a Han character, thus making clear how it  should be read, if  it  would otherwise be
ambiguous.
Commenting on what constitutes "the same text," Sperberg-McQueen considers changes
in the margins or font size. The argument rests not on the ways we talk about texts in
electronic form, but on the existing practice of publishing and copyright law. If one consults
a library for copies of Moby Dick, one will find that while different editions take care to
retain the words of the text, in the same sequence, they take no care to retain the page
breaks, margins, or fonts. On the other hand, if a publisher adopts the same page design
and font for a whole series of books, we have no trouble at all distinguishing the volume
devoted to the works of Plato from that devoted to Aristotle, from that containing Moby
Dick. Changing the typography does not, in general, count as changing the text.
A contrary case is presented by Goethe's manuscript of the Roman Elegies which uses a
Latin hand, not German. The early editions printed the work in Roman fonts (Antiqua),
rather  than  in  Fraktur.  Modern  editions  print  all  German  texts  in  Antiqua,  so  the
information  contained  in  the  typographic  distinction  between  the  Roman  Elegies  and
Goethe's  other  poems has been lost.  In  this  case the typography therefore forms an
essential  part  of  the  representation,  or  as  Biggs  summarised  "the  medium  is  the
message."
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Concentrating on individual analytic perspectives, Sperberg-McQueen claims they do not
necessarily determine ordered hierarchies of content objects. Individual disciplines may
deal  with  typographic  rather  than  content  objects:  analytical  bibliography,  codicology,
palaeography, and other disciplines of the history of the book are examples. They may
deal  with sets or  other unordered groups of  objects,  rather than with ordered groups:
lexicology, for example, and many forms of quantitative stylistics, often address a text as
an unordered set  of  lexical  items.  Most  critically,  disciplines may address phenomena
which are not themselves hierarchical, e.g., morphophonemic analysis, since phonemic
phenomena may overlap morphological boundaries. Traditional stylistic analysis of verse
includes the study of enjambment, end-stopping, and other phenomena of the interaction
between  non-nesting  metrical  and  syntactic  phenomena.  It  has  been  held  that  the
consistent  overlapping of  phenomena is  prima facie evidence that  they belong to two
different types of analysis. But this should not be taken to mean that they will never be
considered together in the same scholarly work.
Broderick finds agreement between the Realists and the Antirealists that "text is a system
of structures." However this agreement seems to emphasise the lack of clarity in what is
asserted or negated by the Realists or Antirealists. Broderick finds that the essence which
is asserted or negated may be one of four possibilities: the meaning, the structure, the
means to reconstruct the text and the organising principle of the text itself.
The literary Antirealist, which Broderick identifies with a certain Postmodern position, as
opposed  to  the  coding  Antirealists  focused  on  in  the  discussion  to  date,  denies  the
existence of any objective interpretation, or meaning, of a text. It could be Sacred Text,
mythology, naive history, fiction or nonsense. Concerning the coding of a particular text,
the Realist  could remain neutral  with regard to the validity  of  these interpretations.  In
general  there  is  nothing  preventing  a  coding  Realist  from  simply  coding  text  while
remaining  neutral  about  whether  the  meaning  of  the  text  is  reader  constructed  or
discovered, hence a coding Realist could be a literary Antirealist.
The coding Antirealist  may claim that  the structure discovered within the order  of  the
alphabetic characters and punctuation (what Renear calls linguistic components) is not
real. This argument might be suggested by the possibility of format-based processing or
other alternatives to OHCO. However, the Antirealists could not draw on this structure as
evidence for their position, as Renear suggests that they do.
Broderick  proposes  the  thought-experiment  that  after  knowledge of  English  has  been
completely lost, an archaeologist digs up an issue of the Monist. Is it still a text? If the
inhabitants of this age exchange knowledge in electronic format and no longer read the
appropriate kind of character strings? Does a text contain knowledge if there is no one
around  to  read  it?  These  questions  point  out  what  seems  to  be  the  most  credible
Realist/Antirealist distinction. The Realist would answer "yes" to the above questions, the
Antirealist, a "no," qualified only be the possibility that the future archaeologist might figure
out some way to decode the artifact and return its textuality to it.
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Ore comments on Broderick's thought-experiment. He compares this to the case of Cretan
Linear A in which Packard was still able to produce so-called "word-lists." Such "texts" still
meet  Pichler's  defining  characteristics  of  semantic  and  syntactic  dimensions.  Another
limiting case may be provided by Runic  inscriptions (and,  mutatis  mutandis,  by  other
extinct but known writing systems): these may be represented today in normalised Norse
(or whichever language they are supposed to represent). However, Ore claims that we will
never have full knowledge of the text as the carver intended or as contemporary readers
would have read it. So every representation is an entity which has, in Pichler's terms, to
be constructed.
Selmer Bringsjord proposes an alternative to Renear's OHCO theory. The basic thesis of
this  view is  that  text,  at  bottom, is  "jottings plus procedures"  -  hence the proposal  is
referred  to  as  the  JoPP view.  Like  the  OHCO theory,  this  is  a  Realist  position,  and
according to Bringsjord all or most of the arguments in favour of OHCO also lends support
to the JoPP view. However, the objections to Platonic OHCO which push toward Pluralism
and Antirealism, fail to threaten the JoPP position.
The fundamental intuition behind this view is suggested by a thoughtexperiment described
by Wittgenstein in Zettel: Wittgenstein imagines someone (J) jotting down inscriptions as
someone else (R) recites a text, where the jottings are necessary and sufficient for J to
reproduce the document in its entirety. "What I called jottings would not be a rendering of
the text,  not so to speak a translation with another symbolism. The text would not be
stored up in the jottings" (Zettel, 612). Wittgenstein goes on to ask: "And why should the
text be stored up in our nervous system?" (ibid.).
The sort of jotting to which Wittgenstein draws our attention here is suggestive of what
Bringsjord regards text to be at bottom. In order to fix the thought-experiment, suppose






where each ui is associated with a short string from some natural language. Suppose, in
addition, that R recites an essay E of over 2000 words. We assume, as well, that J can, at
any  point  after  hearing  R's  essay,  reproduce  E  from  the  list  L.  So  far,  the  thought
experiment  involves characters,  actions and objects interacting in  a manner we could
certainly witness in the "real world."
The JoPP view is that E is L plus whatever procedure allows for the expansion of L into E.
More generally,  the view is  that  text  is  really,  at  bottom,  jottings plus procedures (for
reproducing a final text, where such a text can be in written or oral form).
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The so-called logicist or symbolicist approach to artificial intelligence (AI) represents the
knowledge, belief and reasoning of sophisticated agents (including human agents) in a
logic  (Bringsjord 1992;  Russell  & Norvig 1995).  Often,  the logic  used is  a particularly
well-understood one, namely first-order logic. In the logicist approach to AI, a document in
natural language is "compressed" to a set of formulae. In other words, the document is
captured by certain jottings. Given certain algorithms, the jottings, or formulae, can be
used to reproduce the story (Bringsjord & Ferrucci 1997).
Thus, it is a basic assumption underlying the JoPP thesis that it should be possible (at
least in principle, though Bringsjord's view is that it is also possible in practice) to design
intelligent  computer  systems  for  text  processing  and  analysis  in  which  texts  are
represented in some logic, and which operate on these representations via procedures in
the  form  of  computer  algorithms.  For  moderately  complicated  texts,  JoPP  is  already
instantiated in some working computer programs.
Bringsjord argues in some detail that most of the arguments in favour of Renear's OHCO
thesis are also arguments in favour of JoPP.
The JoPP view of texts commits us, according to Bringsjord, to Realism. If it is correct,
one of the main arguments in favour of Antirealism (as given by Renear) fails: the JoPP
thesis entails that there is a key set of facts about a text which are thoroughly objective.
The second rationale in favour of Antirealism - that there are many diverse methodological
perspectives on a text - is one that the JoPP approach embraces. In order to produce
different kinds of structure (physical, compositional, narrative, etc.), the procedures going
from jottings to final text need only be suitably adjusted, but the jottings needn't change.
The observations that force modification of OHCO Platonism toward what Renear calls
"pluralistic Realism" are ones the JoPP view accommodates from the outset: the JoPP
approach is designed to allow for distillation of disparate documents. Whether the final
text is a short story, a proof, a physics textbook, a poem, etc. the JoPP thesis is that such
texts can be captured as a set of assertions in a logical formalism.
In the ensuing discussion, one of the first objections to the JoPP view is that first-order
logic, which Bringsjord initially used as an example of the kind of formalism in which the
"jottings" will be captured, does not seem sufficient to represent the basic propositional
structure of texts.
Broderick points out that if the linguistic contents of a text are condensed and represented
in the form of some logical symbolism, this symbolism will contain non-logical constants
which are open to a number of different interpretations. It is difficult to see how the JoPP
view  should  be  able  to  identify  one  such  set  of  interpretations  as  the  "correct"
interpretation of a specific text. Moreover, the claim that a literary text A should essentially
consist of statements in some axiomatic system like first-order logic would seem to imply
the somewhat implausible conclusion that it should be possible to prove A, or alternatively
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not-A.
Raymond argues that since a JoPP representation of a text is not only supposed to be
able to regenerate the propositional content of a text, but also to generate this content in
some specific form, the JoPP representation must contain not only propositions about
some world outside the text but also about the text itself- i.e., it must contain meta-textual
propositions.  Therefore  a  JoPP representation should  potentially  be able  to  represent
logical flaws like contradictions and paradoxes. Thus JoPP is constrained by the limits of
axiomatic  formalisms  -  there  must  be  some  sentential  forms  that  it  cannot  produce,
otherwise it cannot be consistent.
Bringsjord's reply to these criticisms is that his initial reference to first-order logic was only
meant to provide a simplified exemplification - in actual fact firstorder logic would be too
limited. The logical system required for representing the propositional contents of texts
would not be an axiomatic system at all, and thus the envisaged situation of being able to
prove  or  disprove  texts  will  not  occur.  Philosophical  logic  has  provided  a  number  of
systems designed to allow for  contradictions and several  of  those may cope with the
paradoxes referred to by Raymond (Bringsjord & Ferrucci, forthcoming).
However,  according to Raymond,  even though it  may be that  logical  formalisms exist
which  allow JoPP to  handle  inconsistencies  and paradoxes satisfactorily,  one serious
problem with JoPP persists: while text is typically an informal, intuitive notion, JoPP is
typically  a  formal  one.  Proving that  "Text  is  JoPP" is  analogous to  demonstrating the
equivalence between informal  and formal  notions of  computability,  suggesting that  we
need something like a Church-Turing hypothesis for texts.
Raymond  claims  that,  on  the  one  hand,  JoPP  captures  too  much.  Like  Sperberg-
McQueen, Raymond refers to Goodman's distinction between allographic and autographic
representations  and  indicates  that  JoPP  should,  but  does  not  obviously,  exclude
autographic representations. On the other hand, JoPP is too low level a representation:
that they can be represented in some kind of logic does not serve to distinguish texts from
other  kinds  of  information.  Finally,  Raymond  raises  doubts  about  the  Wittgensteinian
thought-experiment  used  to  illustrate  the  JoPP view:  it  rests  on  the  assumption  that
reciting  a  document  is  a  valid  form  of  reproduction.  This  implicitly  defines  away  the
possibility of presentational matter being part of a text. This assumption is confirmed when
Bringsjord says that if the typeface of a document is changed, the text is not. Raymond
has strong doubts about this.
Raymond,  Sperberg-McQueen and Huitfeldt  all  point  out  that  jottings  and procedures
themselves seem to be some sort of texts, thus suggesting that the JoPP view may lead
to a regress or a circle. Huitfeldt and Raymond suggest that a way for Bringsjord to break
this regress or  circle would be to formulate principles for  identifying a set  of  primitive
jottings and procedures which cannot be further reduced.
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Huitfeldt suggests that one of the problems with JoPP is that Bringsjord is not clear about
what  independent  criterion  is  used  to  decide  textual  identity.  At  one  point  Bringsjord
seems to suggest this might be an appropriate set of behaviours and Huitfeldt welcomes
this inasmuch as it points in the direction of seeing texts as social, historical, and cultural
phenomena.
Sperberg-McQueen and Huitfeldt draw attention to an obscurity in the JoPP view: on the
one hand,  texts  are said to  consist  essentially  of  jottings representing a propositional
content which allow us to generate for example translations into different languages, or
paraphrases  within  one  language,  of  the  "same"  text.  On  the  other  hand,  Bringsjord
sometimes suggests that the test of success of a particular JoPP-representation is that
the original text is reproduced "word for word."
Sperberg-McQueen argues that one of the strengths of the JoPP view is that it would give
us a way of explaining why some texts are felt to be similar in certain ways which are
difficult to account for on other models. According to the JoPP view it is because they
share the same "propositional content." However, the JoPP view also seems to reduce
texts to their propositional contents. On the one hand, this makes it possible to explain
what different paraphrases of "the same" text have in common. On the other hand, it may
seem difficult to account for the differences between paraphrases. As there are indefinitely
many paraphrases of the same propositional content, this account of textual identity also
seems to be in some sense too loose.
In contrast, with reference to examples of how our criteria of textual identity varies from
context to context, Sperberg-McQueen draws attention to a large number of different ways
that texts may be identical or similar at different levels, and suggests that in an exhaustive
typology of textual identity relations "JoPP identity" would be but one among many.
Editors: Michael Biggs, Claus Huitfeldt University of Hertfordshire
University of Bergen
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